Masopher's Mind

Osama bin Laden spoke again on December 29, 2007 attempting to rally the Iraqi Mujahedeen not to rest with the (as he put it) victory over American forces but to now look to the greater enemies of “the cause”, the power minded local leaders and the Saudi crown who at the beginning were the ones who invited the US to set foot in the Arabian Peninsula in the first place. The Saudi crown has been implicated in meddling in Afghan post-Soviet affairs and creating disharmony. Bin Laden refers to the vacuum left by the Soviet withdrawal in Afghanistan which led to tribal and partisan conflict over the spoils and fears that in Iraq also, that once the “Crusaders” leave that Muslims will return to their usual sectarian/tribal strife that has infused their religion since the very beginning.

Masopher’s perspective on bin Laden is that his speeches should be most heeded by western policy makers. Unlike the true leaders of Jihad and Middle eastern military groups, bin Laden desires to be seen and heard and therefore cannot afford to be duplicitous and always has to be in the know. He is therefore the analysts most important asset in finding out what’s really happening in the hearts and minds of the Jihad.

It is Masopher’s position that bin Laden is continuing the beat of the war drums further steeping the history of Islam not in the love that the Qran teaches but the strife that not a few of the readers of the Qran practice. It is noted that with America’s withdrawal and defeat, in bin Laden’s point of view the US mainland and assets have slipped down in his attack priority. Bin laden hopes that the US military will lick its wounds while Middle eastern assets will be left exposed. He is content with this position and now hopes to redirect the Jihad against his local enemies, namely Israel, Yemen, Oman and Saudia Arabia perhaps Egypt and Turkey in the long run. Similarly the Afghan Mujahedeen did not pursue the Soviet Tanks back to Moscow, but low intensity warfare spread to Muslim inhabited lands such as Chechnya.

It is understood through Michael Scheuer article, that bin Laden’s appeal indicates that Al-Qaeda does not have a strong enough foothold or influence in Iraq. Many of the fighters may then not be Al-Qaeda in Iraq but Syrian, Iranian and Saudi free agents as well as sectarian groups. Masopher has taken the stance slightly further in assuming that neither bin Laden nor his organization could ever dictate the pace or strength of the Jihad. While their participation and support in the Afghan has always afforded them the respect ear of Taliban and Jihadist leaders, the influence is infallible.

Mr. Scheuer extrapolates that al-Qaeda may go “all out” against the Saudis in an effort to drag American Military back into the gulf. With the military upgrades that has recently undertaken by the Saudis, I respectfully disagree. It has been noted that all future targets mentioned above have dramatically stepped up their military acquisitions since 2001 with Egypt and Turkey being two of the highest clients of American hardware and Saudia Arabia receiving large amounts of European hardware. Based on this fact it is Masopher’s position that the American military would not be needed nor would the incoming American administration commit this political and economically suicidal act. It is Masopher’s position that bin Laden knows this and that he will stick to the plan against Israel and the Shiite sects. American and Saudi assets will continue to experience planned terrorist attacks, however the Iraqi Jihad has a mid to high probability of losing steam in the same way that the Afghan Jihad lost steam.

Homegrown Iraqis will begin asserting their own control of regions and begin wanting insurgents and al-Qaeda out (as in post UK Basra). Foreign born fighters will tire of war and thoughts will turn to families and goat herds. Leaders too will take the initiative to take their battle experience back home to handle their pre-jihad enemies. Without army fatigues white skin and hum-vee’s to fight against, Jihadists and al-Qaeda’s ranks will dwindle as they either turn to more historic foes or realize that they are now fighting their own.

Reference:

Osama bin Laden, “The Way to Foil Plots,” al-Sahab Media Production Organization, December 29, 2007.

Michael Scheuer , “Bin Laden Identifies Saudi Arabia as the Enemy of Mujahideen Unity” The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Focus Volume 5 issue 1 January 8, 2008

Karen Armstrong, Islam – a Short History Modern Library; Modern Library Ed edition (August 22, 2000)